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Abstract
A number of recent papers on double-blind dictator games have ob-
tained significant generous behavior when information regarding the
recipient or any other social context is provided. In contrast, the lack
of information discourages other-regarding behavior and the subject’s
behavior closely approximates the game-theoretic prediction based on
the selfishness assumption. This paper uses framing to explore the
role of helping—behavior in dictator games. The whole experiment in-
cludes both classroom and regular experiments for the baseline and
the framing treatment. To promote these motivations we included
a “non—neutral” sentence at the end of the instructions, which reads
“Note that he relies on you”. Our baseline and framed DG are statisti-
cally different from each other, indicating that the additional sentence
promotes generous-regarding behavior.
Keywords: dictator game, framing effects, helping behavior, altru-
ism.
Psychological classification codes: 3020.
JEL Class.: D63, D64, C91
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1 Introduction
How sensitive are experimental subjects to information regarding their own
choices? Are their decisions easily manipulable? Do framing effects really
matter? Bertrand et al. [1] show that small psychological nuances not only
affect experiments in the lab, but also field experiments where subjects make
choices about loans which have real consequences . This paper offers experi-
mental evidence regarding this issue in Dictator Games.
Recent literature on Dictator Games1 (DG hereafter) shows that a large
percentage of the variability observed in the results is due to the control
of key factors: the lack of anonymity of the experimental subjects with
respect to both experimentalists and other participants (see Hoffman et al.
[13]); the absence of information about the recipient (see, among others,
Burham, 2003 or Charness & Gneezy, 2001); the lack of an appropriate
social context (Eckel and Grossman, 1996), which promotes both social
behavior and increases dictator responsibility and, even more so, the lack
of credibility about the experiment (see Frohlich et al., 2001).
1The Dictator Game is a decision problem in which a player (the dictator) decides how
to allocate a fixed amount of money between another player (the recipient) and himself.
Initially this was considered an excellent way of analysing human altruism because any
amount of money not kept by the dictator was incompatible with a purely selfish subject
and was accordingly interpreted as showing some kind of altruism.
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A number of papers with neutral instructions and strong mechanisms for
anonymity [see for instance, Bolton et al. (1998) or Hoffman et al. (1996)]
reports deviations from the theoretical prediction in very few cases, that is,
completely selfish behavior.
In contrast, papers which deal with any of the issues mentioned above
—non-neutral instructions, information about recipients, etc.— find more pos-
itive results in terms of altruism. Papers that provide examples of how sen-
sitive dictators’ behavior is to the experimental design include that by Eckel
& Grossman (1996) using the American Red Cross as a recipient, Burham’s
paper (2003) in which dictators are provided photos of their recipients, Char-
ness & Gneezy (forthcoming) who give dictators the names of their recipients
or the paper by Brañas-Garza (forthcoming), who informs dictators about
recipients’ poverty .
As a result of these modifications, the amount of money left to the recip-
ients increases considerably, while the percentage of non-zero giving proves
overwhelming. Thus, the conclusion is that the behavior of subjects in the
DG is greatly influenced by how the situation is framed. The idea behind
this is that the information provided to the dictators creates a context that
motivates other-regarding behavior. As Eckel & Grossman (1996) state, in
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the absence of this context, purely selfish behavior drives individual decision
making.
More recently, papers have also focused on selfish motivations which also
promote altruism: dictators are considered to attach a cost (in moral terms)
to the strategy of giving zero. The degree of dictator responsibility and
hence, the magnitude of the cost, increase with problem size. Brañas—Garza
et al. (2005) gives dictators a random device to solve an allocation problem.
Surprisingly, 50% use this mechanism to relinquish their responsibility. In
Dana et al. (2004) or Lazear et al. (2005) subjects are offered the possibility
of exiting the DG at a cost. Based on these arguments a significant number
of players choose to exit the game. Note that playing the game presents not
only larger individual earnings but also potential Pareto (social) gains. Thus,
the observed altruistic behavior is not just the outcome of other-regarding
preferences, but also arises from well—defined, self-centered preferences.
This paper promotes more generous behavior, albeit without any kind of
“procedural/environmental” context. Instead of providing the dictators with
information or devices, we add an additional sentence to the neutral instruc-
tions while keeping anonymity mechanisms. The purpose of the sentence is
to call the subject’s attention to a particular moral rule rather than to create
5
a context in which that moral rule applies, as Eckel & Grossman (1996) and
the other papers cited above did.
Our experiment uses a sentence which is intended to encompass the “uni-
versal” moral rule of helping: “Note that your recipient relies on you”.2 This
sentence is in line with several papers which focus on the emergence of help-
ing behavior [see Schwartz (1970) and Eagly & Crowley (1986)]. We explore
these ideas in two different settings: a classroom experiment and a regu-
lar economic experiment. We found that this sentence promotes generous
behavior to a large extent. In fact, the average, the median and the mode
donation increases as a result of the additional sentence. The rest of the pa-
per is structured as follows. Our experiment is described in Section 2. The
results are shown and discussed in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are drawn
in Section 4.
2 Methods and procedures
The full experimental procedure used in this paper includes two clear fea-
tures: a simple procedure for framing —just a sentence! - and two parallel
2The original wording in Spanish was “Recuerda él está en tus manos”. An alternative
translation might be “He depends on you”.
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settings: a classroom experiment and a regular economic experiment. We
shall now explain both settings and the framing.
Both the classroom and the regular economic experiments comprised two
treatments3: the baseline and the framed Dictator Game. In each experi-
ment, both treatments were performed at the same time, in a single room,
in order to increase experiment credibility —following Frohlich et al. (2001,
Maryland one-room treatment).
Treatment 1, T1 (Baseline): A standard DG. Dictators were given their
instructions and recipients were kept ignorant of what was going on. The
instructions read:
“A fixed amount of 10 experimental units has been provisionally
allocated to you and your recipient. These 10 units are equal to 0.5
extra points towards your final grade in Intermediate Microeconomics.
Your task is to decide how to divide this amount of points between your
recipient and yourself. Any division (even keeping all for yourself) is
allowed. Your partner will be randomly selected from the 20 subjects
sitting in the row to your left. Thank you for participating”4
3The classroom experiment also included a second step in which subjects (after chang-
ing roles) played another framed DG. These actions were ex—post and did not affect the
decisions shown in this paper.
4The above text was handed out after the following initial paragraph was read aloud:
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Treatment 2, T2 (Framing): A framed DG in which dictators received
identical instructions to those given in treatment T1 with the exception of
an additional (non-neutral) sentence at the end of the text. The sentence
read as follows: “Note that your recipient relies on you”. Although Figure 1
refers to R1 & R2, it gives a clear idea:
Figure 1: Visualization of framing (R1 vs R2)
R1 R2
Although the regular experiment essentially replicates the classroom ex-
periment (both treatments R1 and R2 were conducted at the same time in
a single room), we introduced some relevant variations in the regular experi-
ment in order to increase dictator anonymity (regarding the experimentalist).
These included monetary rewards (ten 0.5C= coins plus a 2C= show-up fee for
"Welcome to this experiment on decision making, etc." Between-subjects anonymity was
fully guaranteed. The original instructions were written in Spanish.
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both dictators and recipients), double—blind procedures and two “unknown”
instructors to conduct the experiment.
Another key difference of this new setting is that subjects were asked to
reveal the names of their friends in the class before playing the DG. After
they revealed the list of their friends, they were informed that they would be
matched up with a recipient5. Partners were then randomly chosen from the
list of students enrolled in the first-year course with the exception of them-
selves and their friends. We chose to do so because our recent investigation
focusing on Favoritism (Brañas et al. [5]) shows that when experimental
subjects (dictators) play with their friends, they donate more.
Recall that the only difference between both treatments (T1 vs T2; R1
vs R2) is the sentence at the end of the instructions, as shown in Figure 1.
The classroom experiment was conducted in March 2004 at the University
of Jaén, Spain. The total population sample was comprised of 80 students.
The students were volunteers from two groups enrolled in the course titled
“Intermediate Microeconomics”.6 All of the students were first-year business
5The original instructions in Spanish read: ¿Con quién vas a jugar?: Tu pareja será
escogida al AZAR de la lista de toda la clase excluyendo a tus amigos (revelados en TU
lista). A close translation could be: Who are you going to play with?: Your partner
will be randomly chosen from the whole class list, with the exception of your friends (given
in YOUR list).
6Note that the author was the teacher of this course.
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majors in their second semester, meaning that they had been given no previ-
ous training in Game Theory. Students were recruited by open invitation to
participate in a voluntary exam. Eighty-one students came to the voluntary
exam the day of the experiment. Given that our design required the number
of subjects to be a multiple of four, one of the subjects was randomly selected
to act as monitor and awarded 0.25 points as a show-up fee. The remaining
80 subjects participated in the experiment. Once students were randomly
placed in four rows containing 20 individuals each, the Column 1 subjects
(left side) played treatment T1 at the same time as the column 3 individuals
played treatment T2.
The regular experiment was conducted in January 2006 at the Univer-
sity of Granada using first-year students with identical training to those in
T1-2. Participation in the experiment was voluntary. In order to ensure
anonymity we gave the experimental subjects two envelopes: one for the
money they would keep and another for the money they would like to do-
nate. The instructions clearly explained the decision problem, the basic rules
(see instructions on page 7 —the “experimental units” were substituted for
“0.5C= coins”) and the fact that when the experiment ended, the students had
to exit the room, leaving only one envelope on the table (the money for the
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recipient). Subjects were informed that would be randomly paired with any
individual on the class list, except themselves and their friends. To increase
reputation and to avoid any doubt about the procedure, we informed the
students that a list with the name (and earnings) of the recipients7, not the
dictators, would be made public one hour later. Another potential problem
of the classroom setting was that the Intermediate Microeconomics professor
was in charge of the investigation. Thus to avoid any “experimentalist ef-
fect”, this session was conducted by two Master students8 who were unknown
to the students. 27 individuals received regular instructions (treatment R1)
and 26 received framed instructions (R2) as shown in Figure 1 and explained
above (see instructions on page 7). On average, the subjects —both dictators
and recipients— earned 4.5C= (including the show-up fee) in less than half an
hour.
7To do this we followed a very simple procedure. We took the complete class list and
deleted, for each individual, both his own name and the name of his friends. Once we had
a pure stranger list, we randomly chose one of the names on the list. We had no problems
with our time commitment and made the list public within the hour!
8The instructions also said that the money for the experiment was not ours but had
come from a research project coordinated by a Professor from the Basque Country Uni-
versity (as was the case).
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3 Results
The effect of framing on dictators’ donations (in our four treatments) is shown
in Table 1. Recall that treatments T1 and R1 were baseline treatments,
whereas treatments T2 and R2 were our modified treatments.
Table 1: Donations in T1, T2, R1 & R2.
Donations T1 T2 R1 R2
0 11 2 5 1
1 1 0 2 2
2 4 3 6 3
3 2 7 6 5
4 1 5 5 10
5 1 3 3 5
N 20 20 27 26
Mean 1.2 3.1 2.4 3.3
Median 0 3 3 4
Mode 0 3 2/3 4
St. Dev. 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.3
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Firstly, we analyze the success of our moral framing in promoting more
generous behavior by comparing our framed treatments with their associated
baseline treatments. Recall that the additional sentence read: Your recipient
relies on you (in Spanish “is in your hands”). Our motivation here is that
by making the dictators aware of their recipients’ powerlessness, they will
respond by displaying more generous behavior9.
The Mann-Whitney (χ2 = −3.42; p = 0.00) rejects the null indicating
that T1 and T2 are not drawn from the same population, the comparisson
between R1 and R2 (χ2 = −2.10; p = 0.03) also dipport differences among
treatments. The later means that the additional sentence has an effect on
subjects’ behavior.
By looking at Figure 2 below, where the cumulative frequencies for these
two treatments are plotted, we see that the donations in T2 (R2) first-order
stochastically dominate the donations of the baseline treatment (T1 and R1).
Hence, the additional sentence promotes more generous behavior.
The statistical analysis of the donations provided in Table 1 shows that
the use of the additional sentence (i) increases the average, the mode and the
median contribution and (ii) the number of subjects leaving nothing vanishes.
9Observe that we motivate altruism in the sense of charity (see Khalil, 2004).
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Therefore, our conclusion is that the addition of a promoting-helping sentence
affects behavior.
Figure 2: Treatment Effects
















0 1 2 3 4 5
R1
R2
Finally, we pool the data arising from both experimental settings to per-
form an additional econometric exercise. This estimation permits us to dis-
tinguish the pure framing effect from other effects caused by our procedures.
Recall that differences between T’s and R’s mainly arise from two sources:
when money is given instead of points and double-blind (with the experimen-
talist) vs. single-blind procedures are used. To control other potential effects
we also include data arising from other experimental sessions. In sum, we
join data from our four treatments (40 and 53 observations), from Hoffman
et al. [13] (36 observations) and from Frohlich et al. [12] (17 observations).
The main features of each experiment are labeled using dummy variables.
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This set of independent dummy variables includes:
• framing (F ) which takes value 1 for T2 & R2 and 0 otherwise,
• point—rewards mechanism (PRM) which takes value 1 for T1 and T2
and 0 otherwise,
• two—rooms (2R) which takes value 1 for R1, R2 and Hoffman et al. [13]
and 0 otherwise.
The last variable (2R) permits us to check, with a high degree of precision,
the difference between using separate rooms for dictators and recipients or
not. These variables are used as explanatory variables in a dictator giving
equation and are estimated using OLS and a total of 146 observations. The
estimation of the determinants of dictator giving (DG) is as follows:
DG =2.47 +1.83 · F −1.23 · PRM −0.89 · 2R
(0.62) (0.33) (0.54) (0.48)
where R̄2 = 0.15 and where bc and bF (standard errors between brackets) are
significant for any value of α, \PRM for α = 0.02 and c2R for α = 0.06.
The results can be summarized as follows:
i) In line with recent literature, which precisely begins with Hoffman et al.
[13], the level of social distance with other experimental subjects (two
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room condition) does in fact matter. Two opposing explanations arise:
a) with a 2—room design dictators may believe that recipients do not
exist (since they doubt about the recipient’s existence, they give noth-
ing), b) with two rooms, dictators anticipate that there is no room for
negative reciprocation (not revenge) if recipients are unable to infer
anything about dictator behavior. Given that in our setting the first
explanation seems to be inappropriate (we made a clear commitment to
give the recipients’ their money within the hour), we go to the second:
dictators believe that recipients exist but as they are not close by, they
decide to give nothing. In sum, this is yet another example of the lack
of social context.
ii) Framing goes in the opposite direction. Although we use double—blind
procedures and two rooms, the use of the sentence promotes helping
behavior, that is, we create this social environment! Hence, there is
a positive relation between framing and giving and, as noted by Eckel
& Grossman, this is exactly the proof needed that altruism requires a
context.
iii) The use of points instead of real money also diminishes dictator contri-
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butions. This can be easily explained by the fact that students consider
points towards their grades to be more "dear" than money. Thus, the
use of points instead of money makes students more competitive.10
In sum, our results indicate that separating dictators and recipients (two—
rooms) is negative for giving, that a point—reward mechanism is an extraor-
dinarily competitive device and that, with framing, it is easy to promote a
context in which subjects face a social problem. Hence we can conclude these
estimations with two final ideas. i) Framing matters in the sense that simple
and direct advice to subjects causes the effect that the experimentalist was
interested in promoting. ii) According to the recent field work by Bertrand et
al [1], although framing is not the only device, it is a powerful one to promote
(generous) behavior.
4 Conclusions
The traditional way of promoting other-regarding behavior in DG experi-
ments is to create a context in which fairness and altruism come about as
10Observe that we cannot distinguish between double—blind procedures and point mech-
anisms. Our replications (R1 and R2) use double—blind treatments plus monetary incen-
tives. Recall that the single—blind treatment disminishes individual privacy to behave
selfishly. However, given that the net effect is so negative we may conclude that distance
with the experimentalist is not relevant in this particular setting.
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natural responses (see Eckel & Grossman (1996)). In this paper, that context
has been replaced with a sentence, i.e. we add a sentence to the neutral in-
structions used in standard DG experiments. The aim of adding this sentence
is to draw the subjects’ attention to a particular social or moral rule. Hence,
in our paper, rather than creating the context in which a particular social or
moral rule applies, we induce subjects to use a particular rule. To make dicta-
tors become aware of the powerlessness of their recipients we use the sentence
“Note that your recipient relies on you”. Fortunately, they responded by dis-
playing more generous behavior. We analyze this framing in two different
settings: a classroom experiment using grade points and regular experiments
with monetary incentives (and double-blind). Both environments support
the same result: the above sentence is successful at increasing dictator dona-
tions. In fact, purely selfish behavior, which is so commonly observed in DG
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